

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
COMPANY B 2D BATTALION (MECH) 22D INFANTRY
APO San Francisco 96268

AVDCTV-B

5 June 1969

SUBJECT: Small Unit Action Report

Commanding Officer
2d Bn (M) 22d Inf
ATTN: S3
APO 96268

1. NAME OR IDENTITY AND/OR TYPE OF OPERATION: B Company, 2d Battalion (Mech), 22d Infantry, operations-battalion size through the Ben Gui and Crescent areas.
2. DATES OF OPERATION: 12, 13, & 14 May 1969.
3. LOCATION: Ben Gui and Crescent areas adjacent to Dau Tieng.
4. CONTROL OR COMMAND HEADQUARTERS: B Company, 2d Battalion (Mech) 22d Infantry.
5. REPORTING OFFICER: CPT Eugene J. Johnston, B Company, 2d Battalion (Mech) 22d Infantry.
6. TASK ORGANIZATION: Control Headquarters, Battalion Headquarters, 2d Battalion (Mech) 22d Infantry. Units participating: all combat elements of the 2d Battalion (Mech) 22d Infantry.
7. SUPPORTING FORCES: One Battery, ^{1st} 2d Battalion, 27th Artillery (Dau Tieng), one Battery, 2d Battalion, 77th Artillery (Dau Tieng), air to ground support by Air Force (Issue), and Army Gun-ships.
8. INTELLIGENCE: Agent reports indicated probable enemy occupation of the Crescent areas northwest of Dau Tieng.
9. MISSION: S3 planning included emphasis upon the Crescent areas northwest of Dau Tieng; objectives were placed strategically in order to reconnoiter all possible areas of danger and enemy occupation.
10. CONCEPT OF OPERATION: The concept of the operation included all combat elements of the 2d Battalion (Mech) 22d Infantry, in joint effort to locate an enemy force of unknown size. This enemy force had been effectively deterred from making an attack on the Dau Tieng convoy on 12 May 1969, but had held at first two mechanized infantry companies and later three in contact throughout that day.

SUBJECT: Small Unit Action Report (Con't)

11. EXECUTION: On 12 May 1969, the first of three days of contact, Bravo Company, after terminating a mission in the Michelin Rubber Plantation, reacted to a two (2) company size contact in the vicinity of check-point 108. Upon arriving at the area of contact, Bravo Company assumed the right flank of a three company line formation which moved west through the Ben Cui "Arrow-head". Bravo Company remained in this position for approximately one and one half hours bringing into use indirect fire support from Dau Tieng and gunship support from Cu Chi.

On the second day of contact, the combat elements of the 2d Battalion (Mech) 22d Infantry were jointly conducting a reconnaissance in force mission through the Crescent area northwest of Dau Tieng. The Battalion assumed a "box-type" formation with Alpha and Charlie Company leading, and Bravo and Recon trailing. At approximately 1345 hours, the combined elements were moving through a heavily vegetated woodland; at this time, the lead elements received heavy RPG and automatic weapons fire from the front and flank. The Battalion then adjusted formation to include Alpha and Charlie taking a line stance against the forward contact and Bravo Company and Recon holding the flank. Indirect fire support was immediately employed from Dau Tieng. The ensuing fire-fight lasted approximately 45 minutes. The entire element then pulled back 500 meters from the contact area to meet safety requirements for a heavy air-strike mission, and to erect a defensive perimeter. After the air-strikes were completed and the artillery fire was lifted, the Battalion again moved into a tactical formation with Alpha and Charlie on line and Bravo and Recon holding flank responsibility, and moved once again into the area of contact. After successfully penetrating the area with no results, the entire element began its return movement when it again received heavy RPG and automatic weapons fire from the front and flank. Our elements maintained contact for approximately thirty (30) minutes and again erected a defensive perimeter 500 meters from the contact area. From this position, medical evacuations were attended to as air-strikes and indirect fires were adjusted onto target. When all "dust-offs" were complete, the Battalion relocated to its latter position just southwest of the Ben Cui hard-stand.

On the third day, the 2d Battalion (Mech) 22d Infantry moved northwest of Dau Tieng into the Crescent areas to report findings on a recent B52 strike. The Battalion again moved in a "box-type" formation utilizing Alpha and Bravo in the lead, with Charlie and Recon trailing. The Battalion moved through the objective area with negative findings, and continued on a northerly direction. After clearing the target area by approximately one kilometer, the forward elements began to receive heavy RPG and automatic weapons fire supplemented by 60 millimeter mortar fire. The elements adjusted formation to a complete line with one platoon of Bravo Company acting as rear security, and maintained contact for approximately forty-five (45) minutes utilizing indirect fire support from Dau Tieng. After breaking contact, the Battalion regrouped and pulled back to a defensive position where medical evacuations were attended to and air-strikes were directed on target. Once all "dust-offs" were completed, the Battalion relocated to a night latter position just west of the Ben Cui Arrowhead.

AVDCIV-B

5 June 1969

SUBJECT: Small Unit Action Report (Con't)

12. ADMINISTRATIVE MATTERS: Medevac statistics were compiled at the Battalion Aid Station and disseminated to the Company level. Combat awards were forwarded through the Company awards clerk to higher headquarters.

13. SPECIAL EQUIPMENT AND TECHNIQUES: Navigation due to the extreme thickness of terrain was handled principally from the air. The formations utilized allowed for rapid supporting movement to counter the many danger areas common to the Crescent. During some movement, Air Force "spotter planes" were utilized, allowing for additional assistance in the area of air observation and also producing a situation where-by air strikes could be ordered more quickly.

14. COMMANDER'S ANALYSIS: Of primary importance during a Battalion size operation is a highly functional system of communication with good net procedure. Also, with reference to missions including Battalion size elements, indirect fire preparations (both inorganic and organic to the unit) cannot be stressed enough. Lastly, with attention to movement, especially with joint operations, caution should be exerted towards well planned and executed moves. Time should never be placed before proper care in execution in view of importance.


EUGENE J. JOHNSTON
CPT, INF
Commanding